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Abstract
In the coin problem, one is given n independent flips of a coin that has bias β > 0 towards either
Head or Tail. The goal is to decide which side the coin is biased towards, with high confidence.
An optimal strategy for solving the coin problem is to apply the majority function on the n
samples. This simple strategy works as long as β > Ω(1/
√
n). However, computing majority is
an impossible task for several natural computational models, such as bounded width read once
branching programs and AC0 circuits.
Brody and Verbin [8] proved that a length n, width w read once branching program cannot
solve the coin problem for β < O(1/(logn)w). This result was tightened by Steinberger [20] to
O(1/(logn)w−2). The coin problem in the model of AC0 circuits was first studied by Shaltiel
and Viola [19], and later by Aaronson [1] who proved that a depth d size s Boolean circuit cannot
solve the coin problem for β < O(1/(log s)d+2).
This work has two contributions:
We strengthen Steinberger result and show that any Santha-Vazirani source with bias β <
O(1/(logn)w−2) fools length n, width w read once branching programs. In other words, the
strong independence assumption in the coin problem is completely redundant in the model
of read once branching programs, assuming the bias remains small. That is, the exact same
result holds for a much more general class of sources.
We tighten Aaronson’s result and show that a depth d, size s Boolean circuit cannot solve
the coin problem for β < O(1/(log s)d−1). Moreover, our proof technique is different and we
believe that it is simpler and more natural.
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1 Introduction
In the Coin Problem, defined by Brody and Verbin [8], one is given n independent flips of a
coin that has bias β > 0 towards either Head or Tail. The goal is to decide which side the
coin is biased towards, with high confidence (say, 2/3). It is not hard to see that the best
strategy for solving the coin problem is to apply the majority function on the n outcomes. By
Chernoff bound, this strategy works as long as β > c/
√
n, for some large enough constant c.
However, taking the majority on n bits is provably an impossible task for several natural
computational models, such as bounded width read once branching programs (henceforth,
ROBP) and AC0 circuits.
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The coin problem is related to two other well-studied notions of approximating the
majority function. The first notion is the “promise” problem of computing majority. Namely,
it asks for upper and lower bounds, in different computational models, for computing the
majority function correctly only on inputs that have bias at least ε. This central problem
received a considerable attention in the literature (see [2], [4], [21], [3], [9], [5], [25], [26], [13],
[10] and references therein). In the second notion (see, e.g., [16], [5]) one considers functions
that agree with the majority function on all but δ fraction of the inputs (regardless of their
Hamming weight). The coin problem can be seen as a combination of these two notions.
Intuitively, it is an easier problem to solve as it allows both types of slackness, and thus
poses a greater challenge for proving lower bounds.
Motivated by the construction of pseudorandom generators for ROBP, Brody and Verbin
[8] considered the coin problem for the model of ROBP with bounded width. Informally
speaking, a width w ROBP is a non-uniform model of computation that gets the flip outcomes
one by one in a stream, and can “remember” at most log2 w bits of information at each point
in time, concerning the past outcomes. For, say, constant w, such a model cannot compute
majority.1
In [8] it is shown that width w length n ROBP cannot solve the coin problem for
β < O(1/(logn)w). This result was later tightened by Steinberger [20] to β < c/(2 logn)w−2
for some constant c.
A different, yet essentially equivalent formulation of the coin problem, is where given a
coin that is either unbiased or has bias at least β > 0 towards Head, the goal is to distinguish
between the two cases, with high confidence. As mentioned above, Brody and Verbin [8], and
later on Steinberger [20], proved that a product distribution of bits, with small enough bias
each, cannot be distinguished from the uniform distribution by ROBPs with bounded width.
In other words, a product distribution with small enough bias fools ROBPs with bounded
width.
Our first result shows that the independence assumption, which is necessary in many
settings, is in fact completely redundant. More formally, we show that any Santha-Vazirani
source, with small enough bias, fools ROBPs with bounded width. Recall that a Santha-
Vazirani source [18] on n bits with bias β is a distribution X1, . . . ,Xn, where each bit Xi is
some adversarially chosen (probabilistic) function of X1, . . . ,Xi−1, under the promise that
bias(Xi | X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1) ≤ β, for all prefixes x1, . . . , xi−1.
Santha-Vazirani sources form a much richer class of sources than product distributions,
and have been considered in the literature in various contexts (e.g., [18, 22, 23, 24, 17]).
As mentioned, the original motivation of Brody and Verbin for studying the coin problem
came from their approach of constructing pseudorandom generators for ROBPs. This
approach yields pseudorandom generators for a natural subclass of ROBPs called regular
ROBPs (see also, [7]). It is not clear how to construct pseudorandom generators for the
non-regular case, and it is plausible that Santha-Vazirani sources are a much better starting
point for such constructions. In fact, one can view the proof of Braverman et al. [7] as
approximating Santha-Vazirani sources by recursively applying the pseudorandom generator
of Impagliazzo et al. [12].
I Theorem 1 (Santha-Vazirani sources fool ROBPs, informally stated). There exists a universal
constant c > 0 such that the following holds. Any Santha-Vazirani source on n bits with bias
β < c/(2 logn)w−2 fools length n, width w ROBPs.
1 In this context, it is interesting to note that the classical result of Barrington [6] states that without the
read-once requirement, width 5 is sufficient for computing majority.
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The proof of the above theorem is based on a reduction to the result of Steinberger [20].
We move on to present our second result. As a matter of fact, the coin problem was studied by
Shaltiel and Viola [19] and later by Aaronson [1] even prior to the work of Brody and Verbin.
The motivation for studying the coin problem in each of these papers was completely different.
While Brody and Verbin were motivated by the study of pseudorandom generators for ROBPs,
Shaltiel and Viola considered the problem of hardness amplification, and Aaronson studied
the seemingly unrelated problem of obtaining an exponential oracle separation between BQP
and PH.
Aaronson ([1], Corollary 12) proved that any depth d Boolean circuit on n inputs that
distinguishes a fair coin from an ε-biased coin, with constant confidence, must have size
exponential in (1/ε)1/(d+2). A similar result is implicit in [19].
The proof strategy of Shaltiel and Viola was to transform any circuit that distinguishes a
fair coin from a coin with bias ε, to a circuit that computes majority on Ω(1/ε) inputs, to
which standard lower bounds apply [11, 14]. Taking a similar strategy, to prove his lower
bound, Aaronson shows that a circuit that solves the coin problem can be transformed into a
circuit that accepts all n bit strings with Hamming weight n/2 + 1 while rejecting all strings
with Hamming weight n/2. Again, by [11, 14], the latter task is known to require large
bounded depth circuits. In the reduction, both papers make use of depth 3 circuits for the
problem of approximate majority [2], [25].
Our second contribution is an improvement over Aaronson’s result. We give a tight lower
bound for the size of a depth d circuit that solves the coin problem.
I Theorem 2 (Coin Problem for AC0, informally stated). There exists a universal constant
c > 0 such that the following holds. A depth d, size s Boolean circuit on n inputs cannot
solve the coin problem for
β <
1
(c log s)d−1 .
This is tight up to the multiplicative constant c [5].
Moreover, our proof technique is different and we believe that it is simpler and more
natural, and it gives the tight bound. The intuition is the following: suppose one applies, say,
10β random restriction to the input (see Section 2.3 for the precise definition). Then, one
expects that a function f that solves the coin problem for bias β, applied to the resulting
restricted input, should not be constant with high probability, whereas by known results [11],
[14] such random restriction typically collapses a bounded depth circuit to some constant. The
formal proof formalizes this by expressing the confidence of f in terms of the Fourier spectrum
of a random restriction applied to f (see Lemma 14), where the restriction parameter is
related to the bias of the coin.
In this context, it is interesting to mention the work of Viola [26], who showed that a
depth d, size s circuit can compute majority under the promise that the input has bias
Ω(1/(log s)d−3), and proved that this is tight. Moreover, Viola proved that a randomized
circuit with depth d and size s can compute majority under the promise that the input has
bias Ω(1/(log s)d−1), and again, he proved that this bound is tight. We note however that
the coin problem is an easier problem to solve, since the circuit may err on many inputs, and
thus proving lower bounds is potentially more challenging.
2 Preliminaries
It will be convenient for us to think about coins with sides {±1}. The bias of a {±1} random
variable X, denoted by bias(X), is defined as 12 · |Pr[X = 1]−Pr[X = −1]|.
G. Cohen, A. Ganor, and R. Raz 621
I Definition 3. Let ε ∈ [0, 12 ]. Define the product distribution Xnε supported on {±1}n as
follows. For x ∼ Xnε it holds that Pr[xi = 1] = 12 + ε (and thus Pr[xi = −1] = 12 − ε) for all
i ∈ [n].
We note that the uniform distribution over {±1}n, denoted by Un, is the same as Xn0 . When
n is clear from context we omit the superscript and write Xε and U.
I Definition 4 (Santha-Vazirani Sources). A distribution X supported on {±1}n is called a
Santha-Vazirani source with bias ε, if for every i ∈ [n] and every x1, . . . , xn ∈ {±1}, it holds
that
bias (Xi | X1 = x1,X2 = x2, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1) ≤ ε.
I Definition 5. For a function f : {±1}n → {±1} and a distribution D supported on {±1}n,
the distinguishability of D from U by f is given by
Distinguishability(f,D) = |E[f(D)]− E[f(U)]| .
For ε ∈ [0, 12 ], let Distinguishability(f, ε) denote Distinguishability(f,Xε).
2.1 Read Once Branching Programs
A branching program of length n and width w is a directed (multi-) graph with n layers
V0, . . . , Vn−1 of w nodes each, called states, and a final layer Vn with two nodes, accept and
reject. The branching program has a designated start node on layer V0. For every internal
node (that is, nodes in layers V0, . . . , Vn−1), there are exactly 2 edges going out of it and
both these edges go to nodes on the next layer of the branching program. One of these
edges is labeled by 1 and the other is labeled by −1. There are no edges going out of the
accept and reject nodes. The computation of a branching program of length n on a string
x = x1, . . . , xn ∈ {±1}n is defined in the natural way, by following the edge labeled xi at
step i, starting from the start node. The computation accepts x if it reaches the accept
state and rejects otherwise. This branching program just described is a read-once branching
program, since each character of x is examined exactly once.
For a branching program f , an internal state s and b ∈ {±1}, let sf (b) denote the state
reached by following the edge labeled b going out of s in f . When f is clear from context
we write s(b) instead of sf (b). For a string x ∈ {±1}n we define the output of f to be
f(x) := −1 if f accepts x and f(x) := 1 otherwise. For any state s, let Rf,x(s) denote the
event that the computation of f on input x reaches s. When f and x are clear from context
we write R(s) instead of Rf,x(s). Hence, for a distribution X over {±1}n, E[f(X) | R(s)] is
the expected output of f on input X, conditioned on the event that the computation reaches
s, and Pr[Xi = b | R(s)] for b ∈ {±1} and i ∈ [n], is the probability that Xi = b conditioned
on the event that f on input X reaches s. To simplify notation, for any two states s1, s2, let
R(s1, s2) denote the event that the computation of f on input x reaches both s1 and s2.
2.2 Bounded Depth Circuits
We consider circuits consisting of unbounded fan-in AND, OR gates applied to input variables
and their negation. We only consider circuits with one output. The size of a circuit is the
number of gates it contains. The depth is defined as the length of the longest path (in edges)
from any input to the output. The depth of a gate g in a circuit is the depth of the sub-circuit
with output gate g.
A circuit is called layered if for every d ≥ 1, the inputs of any depth d gate in the circuit
are the outputs of depth d− 1 gates. A layered circuit is called alternating if the inputs to
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an AND gate (OR gate) with depth greater than 1 are the outputs of OR gates (AND gates).
By standard arguments, for any size s, depth d Boolean circuit C there exists an alternating
circuit C ′ with size at most d · s and depth d that computes the same function as C. The
width of a layered circuit is the maximum fan-in of the gates in the bottom layer.
2.3 Fourier Analysis
I Definition 6. For a parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ {±1}n, define the distribution Nρ(x)
supported on {±1}n as follows. For y ∼ Nρ(x), for all i ∈ [n] independently, with probability
ρ the variable yi is being set to xi, and with probability 1 − ρ the variable yi is sampled
uniformly at random from {±1}.
I Definition 7. Let ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The noise operator Tρ, acting on the set of functions
{f : {±1}n → R}, is defined as
Tρf(x) = E[f(Nρ(x))].
The following well-known lemma relates the Fourier representation of Tρf to that of f .
I Lemma 8. For any f : {±1}n → R and ρ ∈ [0, 1],
Tρf(x) =
∑
S⊆[n]
ρ|S|f̂(S)χS(x).
For ρ ∈ [0, 1], a ρ random restriction is the following probabilistic process. For each
i ∈ [n], independently, leave it unset with probability ρ, and with probability 1− ρ set it to
±1 uniformly and independently at random. We denote a restriction by (J |z) where J ⊆ [n]
is the set of indices of unset variables and z ∈ {±1, ∗}n is the values assigned to the variables,
where the variables in J are assigned the symbol ∗. More precisely, zi = ∗ if and only if
i ∈ J , and otherwise zi is the value assigned to the ith variable.
Let f : {±1}n → R, and let (J |z) be a restriction. We define the restricted function
f(J|z) : {±1}n → R as follows: For x ∈ {±1}n, f(J|z)(x) = f(y), where y ∈ {±1}n is defined
as follows:
yi =
{
xi, i ∈ J ;
zi, i 6∈ J .
The following lemma can be found in [15].
I Lemma 9. Let f : {±1}n → R. Let (J |z) be a ρ random restriction. Then for S ⊆ [n],
E(J|z)
[
f̂(J|z)(S)
]
= ρ|S| · f̂(S).
3 Santha-Vazirani Sources Fool Read Once Branching Programs
The following is the main theorem of this section, which is a formal restatement of Theorem 1.
I Theorem 10. For any n,w such that 2 ≤ w ≤ lognlog logn the following holds. Let f be a
width w, length n ROBP. Then, for any ε ∈ [0, 1] and any Santha-Vazirani source X with
bias ε,
Distinguishability (f,X) ≤ ε · (2 logn)w−2 · (1 + o(1)).
The proof of Theorem 10 is via a reduction to the lower bound for ROBP solving the coin
problem given by Brody and Verbin [8] and later improved by Steinberger [20]. The following
theorem is an adjustment of the lower bound of [20] (see Theorem 1 therein) to our notation.
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I Theorem 11 ([20]). For any n,w such that 2 ≤ w ≤ lognlog logn the following holds. Let f be
a width w, length n ROBP. Then, for any ε ∈ [0, 1],
Distinguishability(f, ε) ≤ ε · (2 logn)w−2 · (1 + o(1)).
The following lemma, which formalizes the reduction, together with Theorem 11 complete
the proof of Theorem 10.
I Lemma 12. Let f be a width w, length n ROBP. Let X be a Santha-Vazirani source with
bias ε. Then, there exists a width w, length n ROBP g such that
Distinguishability (f,X) ≤ Distinguishability(g, ε). (1)
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that E[f(U)] ≤ E[f(X)]. Note that we may
assume that for every layer i ∈ [n] and every internal state s on Vi−1, it holds that
Pr[Xi = −1 | R(s)] ≤ Pr[Xi = 1 | R(s)]. (2)
If this is not the case, we flip the ith coordinate of X in the event that f reaches s on input
X1, . . . ,Xi−1. Note that X remains a Santha-Vazirani source with bias ε. We change f
accordingly, by switching the edges going out of s in f . Doing so, the expected output of
(the resulted) f , both under the uniform distribution and under (the resulted distribution)
X, does not change.
We define hybrid distributions X(n),X(n−1), . . . ,X(0) as follows. For every i ∈ [n+ 1], let
X(i−1) be a distribution where the first i− 1 bits are distributed according to X and the rest
of the bits are distributed according to Xε, independently of all other bits. Note that X(0) is
exactly Xε and X(n) is exactly X. We define f (n) = f and given f (i) for some i ∈ [n], we
define f (i−1) as follows. Let t1, t2, . . . , t|Vi| be an order of the states on layer Vi such that for
every 1 ≤ j < |Vi|,
E[f (i)(Xε) | R(tj)] ≥ E[f (i)(Xε) | R(tj+1)].
We start with f (i−1) = f (i). Fix some state s on layer Vi−1 and let j1, j−1 be the indices such
that sf(i−1)(1) = tj1 and sf(i−1)(−1) = tj−1 . If j1 > j−1 then we switch the edges going out
of s in f (i−1). Clearly, the expected output of f (i−1) under the uniform distribution does not
change. Moreover, since we change only edges that are going out of layer i− 1, we get that
E[f (i−1)(Xε) | R(sf(i−1)(−1))] ≤ E[f (i−1)(Xε) | R(sf(i−1)(1))]. (3)
First, we analyze how the expectation under the distribution X(i) changes when we switch
from f (i) to f (i−1). By the definition of X(i), for every b ∈ {±1} it holds that
E[f (i−1)(X(i)) | R(s, sf(i−1)(b))] = E[f (i−1)(Xε) | R(sf(i−1)(b))]
and
Pr[X(i)i = b | R(s)] = Pr[Xi = b | R(s)].
Therefore,
E[f (i−1)(X(i)) | R(s)] =
∑
b∈{±1}
E[f (i−1)(X(i)) | R(s, sf(i−1)(b))] ·Pr[X(i)i = b | R(s)]
=
∑
b∈{±1}
E[f (i−1)(Xε) | R(sf(i−1)(b))] ·Pr[Xi = b | R(s)].
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In the same way,
E[f (i)(X(i)) | R(s)] =
∑
b∈{±1}
E[f (i)(Xε) | R(sf(i)(b))] ·Pr[Xi = b | R(s)]
=
∑
b∈{±1}
E[f (i−1)(Xε) | R(sf(i)(b))] ·Pr[Xi = b | R(s)].
When we switch from f (i) to f (i−1), we ensure that Equation (3) holds, and thus, assuming
that Equation (2) also holds, the expectation can only increase. That is,
E[f (i)(X(i)) | R(s)] ≤ E[f (i−1)(X(i)) | R(s)]. (4)
Next, we analyze how the expectation of f (i−1) changes when we switch from X(i) to X(i−1).
By the definition of X(i−1), for every b ∈ {±1} it holds that
E[f (i−1)(X(i−1)) | R(s, sf(i−1)(b))] = E[f (i−1)(Xε) | R(sf(i−1)(b))]
and
Pr[X(i−1)i = b | R(s)] = Pr[(Xε)i = b | R(s)].
Therefore,
E[f (i−1)(X(i−1)) | R(s)] =
∑
b∈{±1}
E[f (i−1)(Xε) | R(sf(i−1)(b))] ·Pr[(Xε)i = b | R(s)].
Since Pr[Xi = 1 | R(s)] ≤ 12 + ε = Pr[(Xε)i = 1 | R(s)], and since Equation (3) holds, when
we switch from X(i) to X(i−1), the expectation can only increase. That is,
E[f (i−1)(X(i)) | R(s)] ≤ E[f (i−1)(X(i−1)) | R(s)]. (5)
Combining Equations (4) and (5), we get that
E[f (i)(X(i)) | R(s)] ≤ E[f (i−1)(X(i−1)) | R(s)].
Finally, note that PrX(i−1) [R(s)] = PrX(i) [R(s)]. Therefore, by repeating the above argu-
ments for every s ∈ Vi−1, and summing over them, we get that E[f (i)(U)] = E[f (i−1)(U)]
and E[f (i)(X(i))] ≤ E[f (i−1)(X(i−1))]. Since this holds for every i ∈ [n], we get that
Distinguishability(f (n),X(n)) ≤ Distinguishability(f (0),X(0)),
as stated. J
4 The Coin Problem for AC0
The following is the main theorem of this section, which is a formal restatement of Theorem 2.
I Theorem 13. Let f be a function computable by a size s, depth d Boolean circuit. Then,
for all δ ∈ (0, 12 ]
Distinguishability
(
f,
δ
(120 · log (12s/δ))d−1
)
≤ δ.
We note that this result is tight [5]. To prove Theorem 13, we start by proving a lemma that
expresses the distinguishability of a function in terms of the behavior of the function under
random restrictions.
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I Lemma 14. Let f : {±1}n → {±1} and let ε ∈ [0, 12 ]. If (J |z) is a 2ε random restriction
then
Distinguishability(f, ε) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣E(J|z)
 ∑
∅6=S⊆[n]
f̂(J|z)(S)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Proof. We first note that the distributions Xnε and N2ε(1n) are the same. Indeed, both are
product distributions, and for any x ∼ Xnε and i ∈ [n], Pr[xi = 1] = 12 + ε by definition. On
the other hand, if x ∼ N2ε(1n) then
Pr[xi = 1] = 2ε · 1 + (1− 2ε) · 12 =
1
2 + ε.
Thus
E[f(Xnε )] = E[f(N2ε(1n))].
According to Definition 7, we can write the RHS of the above equation as
T2εf(1n) =
∑
S⊆[n]
(2ε)|S|f̂(S)χS(1n) =
∑
S⊆[n]
(2ε)|S|f̂(S),
where the first equality follows by Lemma 8. This, together with Lemma 9, implies that for
(J |z), a 2ε random restriction, we have that
E[f(Xnε )] =
∑
S⊆[n]
E(J|z)
[
f̂(J|z)(S)
]
= E(J|z)
 ∑
S⊆[n]
f̂(J|z)(S)
.
On the other hand,
E[f(U)] = f̂(∅) = E(J|z)
[
f̂(J|z)(∅)
]
,
where the last inequality follows by Lemma 9. Thus,
Distinguishability(f, ε) = |E[f(Xε)]− E[f(U)]| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣E(J|z)
 ∑
∅6=S⊆[n]
f̂(J|z)(S)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
as claimed. J
We also need the following well-known theorem, which is implicit in the result of [14] (see
also [15], Chapter 4). For completeness, we give a proof of this theorem in Appendix A.
I Theorem 15. For any δ ∈ (0, 1) the following holds. Let f : {±1}n → {±1} be a function
computable by an alternating circuit with size s, depth d ≥ 3 and width w. Let ` = log( 2sδ )
and let ρ = 110w ·
( 1
10`
)d−3 · δ10` . If (J |z) is a ρ random restriction then
Pr
(J|z)
[
f(J|z) is non-constant
] ≤ δ.
Lastly, the proof of Theorem 13 makes use of the following lemma.
I Lemma 16. Let δ > 0. Let f be a function computable by an alternating circuit with size
s and depth d. Assume further that the bottom layer is an AND layer. Then, there exists a
function g computable by an alternating circuit with size s, depth d and width 3 log (2s/δ)
such that for every ε ≤ 1/4
|Ex∼Xε [(f − g)(x)]| ≤ δ.
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Proof of Lemma 16. Consider an alternating circuit with size s and depth d that computes
f , with bottom layer consists of AND gates. By cutting all AND gates in the bottom layer
with fan-in larger than 3 log (2s/δ) we get a function g computable by an alternating circuit,
consists of AND gates at the bottom layer, with size s, depth d and width 3 log (2s/δ).
We note that g−1(1) ⊆ f−1(1). On the other hand, consider a fan-in k AND gate that
we cut. The probability, under Xε, that this AND gate outputs 1 is at most ( 12 + ε)k. Since
we only cut AND gates with fan-in at least 3 log (2s/δ)(
1
2 + ε
)k
≤
(
1
2 + ε
)3 log (2s/δ)
≤ δ2s ,
where the last inequality follows by our assumption that ε ≤ 14 (which yields
( 1
2 +
1
4
)3
< 12 ).
Thus, by taking a union bound over all, at most s, AND gates with fan-in at least 3 log (2s/δ)
we get that
Pr
x∼Xε
[f(x) 6= g(x)] ≤ δ2 .
Since f, g have range {±1} the above equation implies that |Ex∼Xε [(f − g)(x)]| ≤ δ as
stated. J
Proof of Theorem 13. By the assumption of the theorem, there exists a size s, depth d
circuit C that computes f . By standard arguments (see Section 2.2), there exists a size d · s,
depth d alternating circuit C ′ that computes f . We may assume, without loss of generality,
that the bottom layer of C ′ consists of AND gates. If this is not the case then we can replace
every OR gate at the bottom layer with an AND gate applied to the negation of the literals
which are wired to the original OR gate. By De Morgan’s Law, it follows that the output
of this new AND gate is the negation of the output of the original OR gate. We can thus
continue with this process, layer by layer from bottom to top, switching the type of gates
in each layer. At the end of the process we get an alternating circuit, with size d · s and
depth d, that computes the negation of f . Clearly, a function and its negation have the same
distinguishability.
By Lemma 16, there exists a function g, computable by an alternating circuit with size
d · s, depth d and width w = 3 log (12ds/δ) such that
|Ex∼Xε [(f − g)(x)]| ≤
δ
6 (6)
for all ε ≤ 1/4. Let ` = log(12ds/δ) and let (J |z) be a ρ = 130` ·
( 1
10`
)d−3 · δ60` random
restriction. Since g is computable by a width w = 3` alternating circuit, Theorem 15 implies
that
Pr
(J|z)
[
g(J|z) is non-constant
] ≤ δ6 . (7)
By Lemma 14,
Distinguishability
(
g,
ρ
2
)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣E(J|z)
 ∑
∅6=S⊆[n]
ĝ(J|z)(S)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
In the event that g(J|z) is a constant function, the entire Fourier mass of g(J|z) lies in the
empty coefficient, and in such case, the sum within the expectation in the above equation
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is 0. On the other hand, by Equation (7), g(J|z) is non-constant with probability at most
δ/6 and so,
Distinguishability
(
g,
ρ
2
)
≤ δ6 ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣E(J|z)
 ∑
∅6=S⊆[n]
ĝ(J|z)(S)
∣∣∣∣ g(J|z) is non-constant
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Note that ∑
∅6=S⊆[n]
ĝ(J|z)(S) = g(J|z)(1n)− ĝ(J|z)(∅),
which is some number in [−2,+2] as g(J|z) has range {±1}. Thus,
Distinguishability
(
g,
ρ
2
)
≤ 2 · δ6 =
δ
3 .
The above equation together with Equation (6) implies that
Distinguishability
(
f,
ρ
2
)
=
∣∣E[f(Xρ/2)]− E[f(U)]∣∣
≤ ∣∣E[f(Xρ/2)]− E[g(Xρ/2)]∣∣+∣∣E[g(Xρ/2)]− E[g(U)]∣∣+
|E[g(U)]− E[f(U)]|
≤ δ6 +
δ
3 +
δ
6 < δ.
Thus, by the choice of ρ we have
Distinguishability
(
f,
δ
(60 · log (12ds/δ))d−1
)
≤ δ.
The proof then follows since d ≤ s. J
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A Proof of Theorem 15
The proof of Theorem 15 relies on Håstad Switching Lemma [11] (see also [15], Chapter 4).
I Lemma 17 (Håstad switching lemma). Let f : {±1}n → {±1} be a function computable
by a width w DNF or width w CNF. Let (J |z) be a ρ random restriction. Then, for every
k ∈ N it holds that
Pr
[
DTdepth(f(J|z)) ≥ k
] ≤ (5ρw)k.
Proof of Theorem 15. Let C be an alternating circuit with size s, depth d and width w
that computes f . For i = 1, . . . , d denote the number of gates at level i by si (and so
s1 + · · · + sd = s and sd = 1). For j = 1, . . . , s2 denote by gj the jth gate at level 2, and
denote by Cj the circuit with top gate gj . Note that all circuits {Cj}j are either CNF or
DNF with width w. Assume without loss of generality that they are DNF.
Let ρ1 = 110w . Consider a ρ1 random restriction (J1|z1). By Håstad switching lemma
(Lemma 17), for all j ∈ [s2],
Pr
(J1|z1)
[
DTdepth(Cj |(J1|z1)) ≥ `
] ≤ (5ρ1w)` = 2−`,
and so, by union bound
Pr
(J1|z1)
[∃j ∈ [s2] such that DTdepth(Cj |(J1|z1)) ≥ `] ≤ s2 · 2−`.
Consider the event in which ∀j ∈ [s2] DTdepth(Cj |(J1|z1)) ≤ `. It is well known that if a
function can be computed by a depth ` decision tree then it can be computed both by a width
` CNF and by a width ` DNF. We can therefore replace each Cj with a width ` CNF. Both
the second and third layers in the resulted circuit consisting of AND gates. We can therefore
collapse these two layers into one layer consists of s3 AND gates. Denote by g′1, . . . , g′s3 the
AND gates in the second layer of this new circuit. For j = 1, . . . , s3 denote by C ′j the width
` CNF with top gate g′j .
Let ρ2 = 110` and let (J2|z2) be a ρ2 random restriction. By Håstad switching lemma
(Lemma 17), for j3 = 1, . . . , s3,
Pr
(J2|z2)
[
DTdepth(C ′j |(J2|z2)) ≥ `
] ≤ (5ρ2`)` = 2−`,
and so, by union bound,
Pr
(J2|z2)
[∃j ∈ [s3] such that DTdepth(C ′j |(J2|z2)) ≥ `] ≤ s3 · 2−`.
We restrict ourselves again to the event in which ∀j ∈ [s3] DTdepth(C ′j |(J2|z2)) ≤ `, use this
fact to replace all C ′j with a width ` DNF and collapse the new second and third layer. We
continue performing ρ2 random restrictions until we are left with a depth 2 circuit, that is,
either with a CNF or a DNF. Note that we perform a total of d− 3 ρ2 random restrictions
(on top of the first ρ1 random restriction). Denote the composed random restriction by
(J ′|z′). Then, except with probability s · 2−` we end up with a width ` depth 2 circuit C ′′.
We restrict ourselves to the event in which C ′′ has width at most `.
Let ρ3 = δ10` . Consider a ρ3 random restriction (J3|z3). By Håstad switching lemma,
Pr
(J3|z3)
[
DTdepth(C ′′|(J3|z3)) ≥ 1
] ≤ 5ρ3` = δ2 .
Thus, if we denote by (J |z) the ρ1ρd−32 ρ3 composed random restriction over all the random
process described above, then
Pr
(J|z)
[
f(J|z) is non-constant
] ≤ s · 2−` + δ2 ≤ δ,
where the last inequality follows by the choice of `. J
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